A central claim in research on interactive conversation is that listeners use the knowledge assumed to be shared with a conversational partner to guide their understanding of utterances from the earliest moments of processing. In the present study we investigated whether this claim extends to cases where shared vs. private knowledge is discrepant in terms of the identity assigned to a mutually seen object that could be misidentified on the basis of its appearance. Eye movement measures were used to evaluate listeners' ability to integrate a speaker's perspective as they identified the referent for an unfolding expression. The results reconfirmed previous findings showing that listeners can rapidly take into account a speaker's awareness of the existence/presence of a referential object. In contrast, however, listeners showed strong consideration of their private knowledge about the identity of an object during referential processing. Strikingly, this tendency was found even when speaker-produced discourse reinforced the way in which the speaker's understanding of the object's identity differed from that of the listener. Together, the results reveal clear and important differences in the way in which distinct types of perspective-based cues are integrated in real-time communicative interaction.
Introduction
Successful communication requires conversational participants to differentiate between what is known to all interlocutors (shared information) vs. what is known to only themselves (privileged information). Indeed, numerous psycholinguistic studies have shown that speakers take shared knowledge into account when constructing utterances, and that addressees use shared knowledge to guide their understanding of utterances (e.g., Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Fussell & Krauss, 1989; Gerrig & Littman, 1990; Gibbs, Mueller, & Cox, 1988) . For a given conversational participant, determining what information is likely shared and what is privileged is itself a complex process that draws on multiple sources of information such as community membership as well as the situational and linguistic context (Clark & Marshall, 1981) and, accordingly, entails various cognitive demands. Consequently, one question that is still widely discussed in contemporary work on real-time referential processing involves the extent to which shared and privileged knowledge are effectively differentiated in the earliest moments of comprehension (e.g., Barr, 2008b; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt, Gunlogson, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Ferguson & Breheny, 2011; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell, 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010) .
In most experimental studies addressing this question, the status of knowledge as privileged vs. shared is manipulated by varying the physical co-presence of the entities that are available for reference. For example, an object may be visually occluded from the perspective of one conversational partner, thereby preventing that partner from knowing whether there is an object behind the occluder (and what it is). By incorporating this individual's perspective, the other partner should, in turn, reduce any expectation for that object to be referred to. In the current study, knowledge differences are instead manipulated by varying interlocutors' understanding of the ''identity'' of entities in a situation where their existence and physical co-presence is already established. This is achieved through the use of objects whose outward appearance is potentially deceptive when it comes to the task of determining the category to which the object belongs (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb). As we will show, a direct comparison of perspective differences involving physical co-presence vs. the identity of entities can provide new and important insights into the underlying processes used to manage knowledge discrepancies in conversational contexts.
In the following sections, we provide a brief overview of research examining listeners' use of perspective information in the course of real-time referential interpretation, as well as research examining the ability to overcome misleading visual cues about an object's true nature. We then describe a series of experiments investigating listeners' ability to coordinate shared and privileged knowledge about object identity in the course of real time spoken language comprehension.
Perspective and common ground in real-time comprehension
As mentioned earlier, a core issue discussed in many recent studies of common ground in comprehension is the time course with which comprehenders can integrate knowledge about a conversational partner's knowledge and beliefs as language is heard. This is an important question because establishing the timing of common ground integration relative to other processes involved in language comprehension, such as syntactic and semantic analyses, is critical for delineating the architecture of the language comprehension system. To address this question, studies typically use a visual-world eye tracking methodology to measure the point at which shared knowledge (i.e., ''common ground'') is used in the course of interpreting an unfolding referential expression. Some studies have suggested that a listener's egocentric perspective predominates during language processing and that the integration of common ground occurs only if linguistic input fails to disambiguate the referent (e.g., Barr, 2008b; Keysar et al., 1998; Keysar et al., 2000; Keysar et al., 2003; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Pickering & Garrod, 2004) . For example, in Keysar et al. (2000) , critical displays included multiple objects from the same category, such as three candles that differed in size (e.g., small, medium, and large). On critical trials, the addressee/participant was directed by a physically co-present speaker/confederate to pick up the small candle in a situation where the smallest candle visible to the addressee was not visible to the speaker. The authors reported that addressees' eye movement behavior reflected an initial tendency to first consider this ''privileged-perspective'' object (smallest candle) as a referential candidate, and only well past the offset of the critical adjective did addressees identify the smaller of the two mutually-visible candles as the intended referent.
However, evidence from other studies has challenged the egocentric-first view by showing that, although addressees do not inhibit their egocentric perspective completely, shared knowledge does have a measurable influence on referential mappings from the earliest moments of interpretation in a variety of circumstances involving different types of referring expressions (e.g., Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Ferguson & Breheny, 2011; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012; Hanna & Tanenhaus, 2004; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008) . For example, Heller et al. drew on known properties of referential contrast to test whether addressees are sensitive to the distinction between shared and privileged knowledge as temporarily ambiguous modifiers were heard in real time. Critical displays contained two sets of objects contrasting in size (e.g., big box vs. small box and big duck vs. small duck). A member of one of the contrasting pairs was visible only to the addressee (e.g., the small box was hidden from the speaker's view) whereas both members of the other pair (big duck and small duck) were mutually visible. The authors showed that, upon hearing the temporarily ambiguous contrastive adjective in instructions such as pick up the big duck, addressees rapidly limited consideration to the intended target object due to its membership in the mutually known contrast set. The other object that was semantically compatible with the adjective (big box) was not considered because this item would not require a modifier from the speaker's perspective (and instead would simply be called the box). This growing body of work suggests that shared and privileged knowledge about referential candidates is effectively managed at both larger and smaller time scales, including temporary indeterminacies in the unfolding signal.
It is important to consider, however, other kinds of knowledge discrepancies that might be more challenging for comprehenders to manage, perhaps because they involve different kinds of underlying mechanisms. In the studies described above, knowledge differences across speakers and listeners were manipulated by varying what we will call the ''existence'' of referential entities in the situational context. In a typical experiment, the speaker (a confederate) instructs the addressee (the actual participant) to move objects located in open shelf compartments, some of which are not visible from the perspective of the speaker because a cover occludes the contents of the shelf compartment. As such, one interlocutor essentially possesses more knowledge than the other, and this knowledge pertains to the existence of referential entities in the relevant context. Although this approach has provided an important methodological template for numerous studies, including work on cognitive development and individual differences in perspective taking (e.g., Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2000; Nadig & Sedivy, 2002) , it provides only one means to explore the coordination of shared vs. privileged knowledge. In fact, as recognized by theory of mind researchers (e.g., Apperly, 2011; Apperly and Butterfill; 2009; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Lombardo, 2013; Low & Watts, 2013) and psycholinguists alike (e.g., Frisson & Wakefield, 2012; Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2003; Schober, 1998) knowledge discrepancies often involve other kinds of perspective differences that go beyond awareness of the existence of referents. For example, Schober (1998) outlined a number of other factors that conversational partners need to consider to successfully coordinate their perspectives, including time, place, identity, and conversational agenda, among other things. Thus, in order to understand the inferential paths that conversational partners can follow to take each other's perspective, and to develop a complete theory of perspective taking in conversation, it is necessary to study cases that reflect qualitatively different types of knowledge discrepancies.
The current paper focuses on situations where knowledge differences involve the identity ascribed to referents whose presence and availability for reference is known to all conversational participants. The question of how individuals manage knowledge about object identity is of broad importance, playing a key role in various phenomena in theoretical semantics and pragmatics as well as in the theory of mind literature. For example, a number of language philosophers have pointed out that terms that objectively might refer to the same entity in a given scenario such as watch and present cannot be straightforwardly substituted in certain contexts without potentially creating an untrue statement (e.g., Davidson, 1984; Ludwig & Ray, 1998; Ray, 1980; Roberts, 1993) . To illustrate, the statement Tom believed that the watch looked expensive cannot be substituted with Tom believed that the present looked expensive in a circumstance where Tom may have had no idea that the watch is also a present for someone. Thus, the correct linguistic encoding of this event requires a direct consideration of Tom's knowledge when deciding on a relevant referring expression, which may differ from the knowledge of the speaker or the speaker's addressee. These ''referentially opaque'' contexts show that successful reference involves not only a specific mapping between a term and a corresponding entity, but also a consideration of how the identity of the entity is or should be represented by the speaker or addressee (Kamawar & Olson, 1999) .
In the theory of mind literature, a number of developmental studies have suggested that perspective differences involving object identity are very challenging for children to overcome compared to cases where perspective differences involve keeping track of which objects are occluded from another's view. For example, at around 14 months of age, children show evidence of understanding that an adult should not see an object if it is blocked by an opaque screen (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007) , or when individuals are wearing a blindfold or have their eyes closed (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2002; Caron, Butler, & Brooks, 2002) , even though the object is visible to the child. In addition, Moll and Tomasello (2006) showed that 2-year-olds understand and adjust communicative behaviors accordingly when another person cannot see an object that is occluded from her/his view, even though the 2-year olds themselves could see that object. In contrast, the representational skills necessary to deal with cases involving discrepancies in object identity appear to emerge later, only between 3 and 4 years of age (e.g., Flavell, 1988; Sapp, Lee, & Muir, 2000) . In a typical task used to assess this ability, children are first shown a visually misleading object (e.g., a pencil sharpener that looks like a ball) and are asked what it looks like. The visually misleading object's true identity is then revealed. Finally, children are asked questions about the visually misleading object such as What does it look like? Does it look like a ball or does it look like a pencil sharpener? (appearance question) and What is it really really? Is it really really a ball or is it really really a pencil sharpener? (true identity question). Flavell showed that in such tasks 3-year-olds typically make either a ''phenomenism'' error (e.g., respond that the object looks like and really is a ball) or an ''intellectual realism'' error (e.g., respond that it both looks like and really is a pencil sharpener). Only at 4 years of age do children begin to respond correctly by noting that although the object looks like a ball, it is really a pencil sharpener. In other work, Apperly and Robinson (1998) showed that only at around age 5 could children correctly gauge when another person would think that a visually misleading object (e.g., a pencil sharpener that looks like a ball) is what it looks like (e.g., a ball) rather than what it actually is (e.g., a pencil sharpener). In sum, then, developmental work suggests that the ability to coordinate knowledge differences related to the physical co-presence of objects develops well in advance of the ability to manage the distinction between appearance and true identity, perhaps because these two aspects of theory of mind may rely on different cognitive mechanisms (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009 ). Of particular interest here is whether the different patterns associated with the latter type of knowledge discrepancy in theory of mind development are evident in real-time referential processing in adults.
To date, experimental attempts to tap into knowledge discrepancies about object identity have used a type of explicit misinformation paradigm for varying the understood identity of hidden objects (Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2003) . For example, in Hanna et al. (2003) , Experiment 2, although two jars that were visible to the addressee but not to the speaker were empty, the experimenter misinformed the speaker that one of them was filled with olives. Furthermore, the speaker had to describe what objects she or he believed the addressee was viewing from left to right just before the speaker provided an instruction pertaining to one of the objects. This procedure was meant to reinforce the addressee's awareness of the speaker's false-belief about the characteristics of the critical objects. In this context the authors found that the addressees were able to overcome their private knowledge about the actual properties of display objects. Thus upon hearing empty in take the empty jar ..., addressees more strongly considered the jar that the speaker falsely believed was the only empty jar (as compared to a condition where the speaker was correctly informed that both jars were empty). Nevertheless, in a situation where the second jar did actually contain olives, addressees were overall fastest at identifying the target referent. The authors take these results as evidence that, although addressees do not completely inhibit their egocentric perspective, they are able to accommodate to the speaker's false-belief about an object's identity during incremental processing. In Keysar et al. (2003) , the experimenter placed a competitor object (e.g., a roll of adhesive tape) in an opaque paper bag, covered it from the speaker's view with an occluder panel and also mislabeled it to the speaker both verbally and with a picture (e.g., in the presence of the addressee attached a picture depicting a small leather ball on the part of the occluder that was visible to the speaker). The target was a mutually visible object (e.g., a cassette tape) whose name overlapped with the name of the actual competitor item from the listener's perspective. Consistent with Hanna et al., the authors observed that addressees considered the competitor object (e.g., adhesive tape) when hearing the tape more than in a control condition where the competitor in the bag was replaced with an unrelated object (e.g., a toy truck). However, unlike Hanna et al., Keysar et al.'s design did not include a condition where the speaker's belief would match the actual identity of a competitor object. Thus, it remains an open question whether a competitor in the Keysar et al. study (e.g., adhesive tape) would be considered even more when the speaker's belief about the competitor's identity is known by the listener to be correct compared to when the speaker is known to have a false belief about its identity. Finally and perhaps most important, the above-mentioned studies do not allow a direct comparison examining whether the ability to manage identity discrepancies is different from the ability to manage existence discrepancies during incremental referential interpretation, and what the precise profile of differences might be.
Current study
The present research addresses three questions: First, are addressees effective at managing shared vs. privileged knowledge about object identity as initial speech sounds of referential expressions are being processed? Second, are they more likely to consider privileged information in this situation compared to the well-studied situations where privileged knowledge involves objects that are not known to be physically present to the speaker? Finally, are addressees less likely to consider privileged knowledge about object identity when the language used in prior discourse explicitly signals a speaker's perspective regarding a visually misleading object's identity? Instead of the kind of misinformation paradigm used in previous studies examining identity discrepancies (Hanna et al., 2003; Keysar et al., 2003) we used visually misleading objects to create a situation where addressees could infer how differing perspectives on an object's identity would arise as a result of the objects' intrinsic visual features, making a misinformation intervention by the experimenter unnecessary. Furthermore, the knowledge discrepancies in the current study involved the semantic category to which an object belonged, and not just a misattributed feature of an object. This brings our study closer in line with work on theory of mind as well as the kinds of cases of interest in theoretical semantics.
To address these questions, we conducted two experiments in which we monitored eye movements as listeners (henceforth addressees) participated in a referential communication task with another individual (henceforth the speaker). In this task, the ability to manage privileged and shared information was measured by examining addressees' consideration of a competitor object whose name shared initial speech sounds with the name of a target referent (e.g., candle, given the target word candy, see Barr, 2008b , for a similar approach). In the typical case, competitor objects attract fixations as the initial speech sounds in the target word unfold in time. In the current experiments, however, the potential for the competitor object's name to overlap with the target depended, in some conditions, on whether addressees considered their privileged knowledge. This is because the objects used as competitors in these cases appeared to be a different category of object altogether, as in the case of a candle that actually looks like a lightbulb. Thus in the absence of foreknowledge about the object's true identity, the speaker could not plausibly refer to this object using a term such as candle, and the object should not attract fixations as the target word (candy) is heard. In Experiment 1, we directly compared addressees' abilities to manage knowledge discrepancies involving the identity of objects with the more well studied situation in which discrepancies involve objects' existence. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether prior descriptions on the part of the speaker that highlight her lack of knowledge about objects' true identity can improve addressees' ability to manage privileged knowledge about object identity in the earliest moments of language processing.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 involved a referential communication task in which participants took the role of addressees who followed spoken instructions such as Take the candy and move it one square down . . .. The instructions were provided by a confederate speaker in a different room, via audiovisual conferencing software. Addressees' eye movements were recorded as they performed the task.
Method

Participants
The participants were 72 undergraduate students recruited from the University of Toronto Mississauga campus community. All participants were either native speakers of English or started to learn English in North America from the age of 7 or earlier. An additional three participants were excluded, either for strategically maintaining their gaze toward the center of the display throughout the entire experiment (n = 1), or because they reported suspecting that the speaker was not another naïve participant during post-experiment debriefing (n = 2). Participants were paid $10 per hour or received course credit for their participation. Participants were tested individually in a single session that lasted approximately one hour.
Materials and design
There were nine critical displays (see Table 1 ). Each critical display contained three items: the target object, the competitor object, and an unrelated object. The experiment included a within-participant manipulation that varied the type of competitor object used in a given critical trial and a second, betweenparticipants manipulation varying the knowledge that the addressee would attribute to the speaker.
2.1.2.1. Competitor type manipulation. The competitor was varied across three conditions (see Fig. 1 ). In the regular phonological competitor condition, the competitor was an object (e.g., a regular candle, a regular yo-yo) whose name shared onset sounds with the target object name (e.g., ''candy'', ''yogurt''). Furthermore, the true identity of regular phonological competitors was apparent on the basis of their outward features (see Fig. 1 , Panel A). As the target name is heard, a competitor in this condition should attract fixations because of the overlapping speech sounds with the name of a target referent (e.g., candle, given the target word candy, see, e.g., Allopena, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998) . As in Barr (2008b) , we draw on patterns of lexical competition to index the extent to which addressees consider privileged knowledge in the course of processing.
A second condition used visually misleading objects (see Fig. 1 , Panel B) to serve as what we refer to as knowledge-based phonological competitors (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb, a yo-yo that looks like a baseball). The visually misleading objects were purchased from novelty stores and as such were items that people might encounter in real life (and were not specially constructed for the purposes of the experiment). These objects play a key methodological role because they allow addressees to easily infer and understand how the identity ascribed to them could differ for two different individuals. In this condition, the potential for the visually misleading competitor object to attract fixations as the target noun unfolds (e.g., ''candy'', ''yogurt'') depends, critically, on foreknowledge about the competitor's true identity. In the absence of the relevant foreknowledge, these objects would instead be categorized in terms of their appearance (e.g., as a lightbulb, a baseball), an outcome that was verified in a separate norming study (see Appendix A). The absence of foreknowledge therefore eliminates the overlap in the name of this competitor type with the target object's name. However, when a knowledge-based competitor's true identity is known (e.g., the lightbulb-looking object is known to be a candle or the baseball looking object is known to be a yo-yo), the competitor gains the potential to attract visual consideration as the target's name is heard.
Finally, in the visual control condition (see Fig. 1 , Panel C), the competitor was an actual instance of the item that the visually misleading competitor resembled (e.g., a typical lightbulb, a typical baseball). The competitor in this condition provides a baseline context where little to no visual consideration of this object should occur. Although the competitor object was varied across the three conditions, the target object and the unrelated object remained unchanged.
A list design was used that cycled the pairing of competitors to object arrays such that participants saw a given array only once. However, across participants, each array occurred in all of the experimental conditions. To facilitate the coding of eye movements, the target object was always placed either in the top-left, bottom-left, top-right or bottom-right compartment of the open shelf display that was located in front of the addressee, and the competitor object was placed in a compartment to the opposite side. The unrelated object was placed in one of the four middle open shelf compartments such that it was not directly beside either the target or the competitor. The targets and competitors were approximately 85 cm apart on any given critical trial (see Fig. 2 for example displays).
Knowledge state manipulation.
The knowledge state attributed to the speaker was also manipulated across three conditions (between participants, see Table 2 for a summary). As noted earlier, the speaker and the addressee were located in different rooms and communicated via audiovisual conferencing software. One third of the participants (n = 24) were assigned to the shared-knowledge Take the candy Fig. 2 . Illustration of a critical display (from the addressee's perspective) as a function of knowledge state (the display was identical for shared-knowledge and privilegedidentity conditions) and the type of competitor, along with the critical instruction given by the confederate speaker. Notes: (1) Asterisk indicates visually deceptive object; (2) the black backgrounds within display compartments represent occluder panels that allowed an object to be visible to the addressee but not to the speaker.
condition. In this condition, objects were placed on the display and named by the experimenter while the audiovisual conferencing system was on-line (i.e., the speaker could see and hear everything being said in the other room). This procedure therefore made it clear to the addressee that the speaker should also know the identity of all objects, including the actual identity of visually misleading competitors. Another 24 participants were assigned to the privileged-identity condition. In this condition, the audiovisual conferencing system was off-line at the beginning of each trial while the objects were being placed on the display and simultaneously named by the experimenter. The system was then turned on just before communication between the speaker and addressee began. This is called the privileged-identity condition in view of the fact that the addressee should consider the speaker to be unaware of the knowledge-based competitors' true identity on critical trials (e.g., that the candle that looks like a lightbulb is actually a candle or that the yo-yo that looks like a baseball is actually a yo-yo). Nevertheless, although in this condition addressees were provided with a cue that the speaker should be unaware of the true identity of visually misleading objects, the true identity of any non-visually misleading objects (including non-visually misleading competitors, see Fig. 1 , Panels A and C) could, of course, be correctly inferred by the speaker from their outward appearance. The remaining 24 participants were assigned to the privilegedexistence condition. In this condition, objects were also placed on the display and were named for the addressee while the audiovisual conferencing system was off-line between trials. Furthermore, certain objects were hidden from the speaker's perspective by placing opaque covers over two shelf compartments before the audiovisual conferencing system was turned on again. On critical trials, one cover hid the competitor object, and the other cover hid an empty compartment. In this condition, the addressee should believe that the speaker could not know either the identity of the competitor or even the fact that the competitor object is on the display. This corresponds to the existence/visual co-presence manipulation used in a number of past studies investigating common ground effects on real-time interpretation. In addition to the nine critical trials, there were two practice trials and 15 filler trials. Thirteen filler trials had displays that contained four objects and two filler trials had displays that contained three objects. In addition, five of the filler trials had displays containing unmentioned visually misleading objects (e.g., a laser pointer that resembled an arrowhead) that had no phonological overlap with other objects and which were not occluded in the privileged existence condition. Three filler trials had displays containing hard-to-name objects (e.g., several constructor-set pieces attached to each other). Recall again that all objects, visually misleading or not, were named for the addressee by the experimenter as they were placed on the display (e.g., In this trial we have a candle [in conditions involving regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors], or a lightbulb [in conditions containing the visual control object], a tennis ball and a candy). In addition to naming, the feature of any visually misleading object that would give away its identity was also demonstrated (e.g., the wick of a candle that looks like a lightbulb, the string of a yo-yo that looks like a baseball). As noted earlier, a norming study (see Appendix A) confirmed objects could be readily oriented in a way that did not give away their identity to the speaker. Three of the nine visually misleading objects were oriented so that the visual feature that could give away their identity was visible only to the addressee (e.g., the wick of the candle that looks like a lightbulb, the tip of the screwdriver that looks like a pen, and the tips of the pencils that look like drumsticks). The other six visually misleading objects were oriented in a way that the visual feature that could give away their identity was visible neither to the addressee nor to the speaker. The location of the items referred to in the instructions was varied in the filler trials so as to break any expectations based on the patterns in the critical trials. On 12 of the trials (6 critical and 6 filler), the first-to-move objects occurred on the left side of the display and on the other 12 (3 critical and 9 filler) on the right side of the display. In the privileged-existence condition, 13 fillers had displays with one object covered from the speaker's perspective (where the objects in question were not visually misleading and had no phonological relationship with named objects) and two fillers had displays with empty compartments covered from the speaker's perspective.
Procedure
Participants (addressees) were led to believe that the confederate speaker was another naïve participant. Upon arrival, each addressee and the speaker (a female undergraduate student who would always arrive a few minutes later) were seated in the same room and asked to complete consent forms and questionnaires regarding language background. While in the same room, they were told that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate how people cooperate on a collaborative task via audiovisual conferencing software, and they were assigned their roles. Thus, addressees did not know that the instructions provided by the speaker were partly scripted.
Addressees were seated facing the shelf display and a computer monitor with a built-in webcam connected to audiovisual conferencing software (see Fig. 3 ). The confederate speaker was then taken to another room and was seated in front of another monitor/camera running audiovisual conferencing software. The shelf display was positioned between the addressee and the monitor/ camera, creating a situation in which the shelf display was viewed on the speaker's display as mirror-reversed and from the opposite side relative to the addressee. A SONY 1/3 00 CCD camera was attached to the center of the shelf display and recorded the addressee's face. The experimenter (in the same room as the addressee) then briefly demonstrated the view that was available to the speaker via the camera/monitor facing the addressee. After that, the main task began. On each trial, the experimenter named objects for the addressee as they were placed in the shelf display. As noted earlier, the audiovisual conferencing program was paused during this phase in the case of the privileged-knowledge conditions. Addressees were explicitly aware of the pause phase in these conditions because they could see the experimenter turn off the audiovisual conferencing program and could observe that the video window on the computer display disappeared and the audio stream from the other room ceased. The end of the pause phase was fully evident to addressees as well because the experimenter had to use the conferencing software to initiate a call to the speaker and the speaker had to answer the call to establish video and audio streams for subsequent communication. After the audiovisual link was reestablished (if it had been paused), the experimenter gave a cue for the speaker to start her instructions. The display was present for approximately 10 s before the speaker started to give her instructions. On critical trials, the first instruction referred to the target object, and the second referred to the unrelated object. The first instruction was of the form Take the [target object name] and move it [location]. For five filler trials, the instructions required the addressee to move two objects. The remaining 10 filler trials required the addressee to move three objects. The instructions never referred to competitor objects-visually misleading or noton critical trials. Furthermore, the instructions also never referred to any visually misleading objects occurring in filler trials. Unbeknownst to the addressee, the speaker followed a partly scripted list of instructions. However, the speaker was allowed to improvise somewhat on non-essential parts of the instructions when the fluency of communication required or allowed for such improvisation (e.g., when the addressee picked up an incorrect object, the speaker corrected the addressee or paused for a longer period of time if the addressee took a notably long time to perform an action).
Predictions
A comparison between the shared-knowledge and privilegedexistence conditions provides a test of whether addressees take into account the speaker's perspective about object existence/visual co-presence during the processing of a noun. For example, if addressees readily integrate knowledge that the speaker cannot see an occluded object, visual consideration of the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors as well as the visual control object should be similar while hearing the temporarily ambiguous part of the target noun in the privileged-existence condition. However, in the sharedknowledge condition, there should be more visual consideration of the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors compared to the visual control object. This comparison will help to inform the existing debate regarding addressees' use of physical co-presence cues to guide real-time referential interpretation. In this regard, a novel aspect of the current study is the use of target-competitor pairs with phonological overlap along with live interactive conversation.
A comparison between the shared-knowledge and privilegedidentity conditions provides the key test of whether addressees are able to take into account the speaker's lack of knowledge about object identity during the interpretation of a referring expression. For example, if addressees in the privileged identity condition can effectively integrate knowledge about the speaker's perspective, they should show comparatively little visual consideration of the knowledge-based phonological competitor (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb) compared to the regular phonological competitor (e.g., a regular candle) and to the same extent as the visual control object (e.g., a regular lightbulb) while hearing the temporarily ambiguous portion of the target noun (e.g., candle). However, as mentioned above, when the actual identity of a knowledge-based phonological competitor is mutually known (shared-knowledge condition), addressees should show comparatively greater consideration of the competitor as the target noun is heard.
Results and discussion
Coding
Eye movements were analyzed from the video recordings using digital playback with synchronized audio and video channels. Eye movements were coded in 33 ms intervals (1 video frame) within a baseline window (an interval starting at noun onset and ending 200 ms later, within which gaze patterns should not reflect signal-driven noun information, see Hallett, 1986 ) and critical analysis window (a 500 ms interval beginning 200 ms after noun onset and ending 700 ms after noun onset, which should reflect early referential processing arising from noun information). Eye position was coded as reflecting a fixation to one of the four corner positions (where the objects of interest were located on critical trials) or ''other''. Fixation position was then linked to the three object types appearing on critical trials based on their location (target, competitor, unrelated) . Eye gaze measures within the baseline analysis window can be expected to capture generalized scanning patterns as well as any anticipatory consideration of display objects before the onset of the target noun. Looking behavior within the critical analysis window will capture eye movements triggered by the unfolding target noun (e.g., candy).
Statistical modeling
Of particular interest in the current study is the extent to which the competitor object is fixated as the temporarily ambiguous part of the target object name (e.g., candy) unfolds in time relative to the fixation pattern just before it started to unfold (the baseline). For example, Barr (2008b) showed that people are less likely to allocate visual attention to objects that are covered from speaker's perspective even before the onset of critical linguistic input. In contrast, it is reasonable to expect that the knowledge-based phonological competitors used in the current study might attract comparatively more visual attention before the onset of the target noun because of their novelty. However, according to Barr (2008b) , the most theoretically relevant measure is the change of visual attention that takes place during the processing of the critical linguistic input (e.g., the target noun) relative to the baseline. This is because this measure gauges the extent to which the processing of the referential expression reflects the integration of contextual information above and beyond any biases leading up to that point. In view of this, the data analyses are based on looks to the competitor, using a weighted empirical logit regression that serves as an approximation to multilevel logistic regression (Barr, Gann, & Pierce, 2011 , also, see Barr, 2008a . Importantly, the analysis window (baseline vs. critical) is included as an additional factor in the analysis, providing an estimate of the increase in the likelihood of gaze to the competitor during the critical analysis window relative to the baseline window, as modulated by competitor type and knowledge state.
Participants and items were treated as crossed, independent, random effects in a linear mixed effects model implemented in package lme4 of the statistical software R 2.15.2 (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2012; R Core Team, 2012 ). The overall model included analysis window, knowledge state, competitor type and their interactions as fixed effects. Of particular interest in the context of the debate regarding the effects of knowledge state on language processing are the effects reflecting interactions between analysis window and the manipulated factors (see Barr et al., 2011) . Thus, this analysis provides a finer index of looking behaviors triggered by the relevant language stimulus, rather than by other factors such as the prior deployment of attention to visually salient objects. Less interesting are the terms in this model that reflect main effects and interactions not involving analysis window. These terms reflect processing across the baseline and critical analysis windows and as such include biases that were present even before the onset of critical linguistic input (the target noun). For this reason below we focus on the interactions between analysis window and the manipulated factors. All other main effects and interactions are reported in Appendix B.
The linear mixed effects model that properly converged included random intercept, competitor type, analysis window, and Competitor Type Â Analysis Window slopes for participants as well as random intercept, knowledge state, competitor type, analysis window, Analysis Window Â Competitor Type, and Competitor Type Â Knowledge State slopes for items.
All fixed effects were evaluated by performing likelihood ratio tests in which the deviance (À2LL) of a model containing the fixed effect was compared to another model without the effect in question but was otherwise identical in random effects structure. If removing the fixed effect caused the comparison model to fail to converge, the model was simplified following the ''best path'' procedures (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) . For the fixed effects, we report v 2 as well as p values associated with the corresponding likelihood ratio test. Graphs plotting the proportion of fixations to the competitor and target as a function of time, the type of competitor, and the addressee's knowledge state are shown in Appendix C. Two trials (0.3%) were discarded due to experimenter error in the placement of objects in the shelf display. Fig. 4 plots the increase in likelihood of gaze to the competitor across the analysis window, knowledge state and competitor type conditions.
Eye movement data
1 Table 3 presents the summary of the interactions between the analysis window and manipulated factors, as well as follow-up comparisons. The mixed effects model revealed that there was no main effect of analysis window (p = 0.178), which indicates that visual consideration of the objects did not differ significantly between baseline and critical analysis windows when collapsing across all knowledge states and different types of competitors. However, there was a significant Analysis Window Â Knowledge State interaction, . However, for the privileged-existence condition, the likelihood of gaze to the competitor was not significantly different across the baseline and critical analysis windows (0.02 vs. 0.05, p = 0.672). In other words, when the competitor objects were occluded from the speaker's view, unfolding linguistic input did not trigger significantly more looks to these objects. In contrast, when the competitor objects were visible to both an addressee and the speaker, the unfolding noun did shift addressees' visual attention to these objects.
The results also revealed a significant Analysis Window Â (1) = 6.66, p = 0.010). However, when competitors were visual control objects, the likelihood of gaze to the competitor was not different between the baseline and critical analysis windows (0.07 vs. 0.06, p = 0.359). Thus there is overall less visual consideration of the competitor when the competitor is a visual control object. The contrast between the visual control and regular phonological competitor conditions is not unexpected because in the former condition there is no match between the sounds in the unfolding target object name and the name for this object. More interesting is that the pattern of gaze was strikingly similar for the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors in the context of this interaction. This outcome suggests that addressees were consistent in the use of their knowledge about object identity (whether it was privileged or not) across the knowledge state conditions. 2.2.3.1. Listeners' ability to manage privileged knowledge about object existence. Although the interaction between analysis window, knowledge state and competitor type was not significant in the overall model, p = 0.186, in view of the observed patterns, and to increase the power, we used two additional linear mixed effects models to test our specific predictions concerning the extent to which the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors were considered relative to the visual control object across the different knowledge state conditions. The first model compared processing within the shared-knowledge and privileged-existence conditions. This provides a statistical test of the extent to which incoming noun information leads the listener to consider privileged knowledge of an object that is not visible to the speaker (as has often been explored in past studies). In the sharedknowledge condition, there should be a larger increase in competitor fixations as the target noun unfolds relative to the baseline window for the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors compared to the visual control object. In the privileged-existence condition, if addressees can readily integrate knowledge that the speaker cannot see an occluded object, competitor fixations should show a different pattern across analysis windows. Specifically, fixation patterns for the visual control object should be more similar to those for the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors in this condition.
The model testing the above prediction regarding different processing patterns of the competitor objects within sharedknowledge and privileged-existence conditions included analysis window (baseline vs. critical), knowledge state (shared knowledge vs. privileged existence) and competitor type (regular phonological competitor, knowledge-based phonological competitor, visual control object) and their interactions as fixed effects. In addition, the model included the maximal random effects structure supported by the experimental design. Below we report only the interaction between analysis window, knowledge state, and competitor type because it is most relevant for testing our predictions. Table 4 (1) = 4.52, p = 0.034) but not with the visual control object (0.07 vs. 0.10, p = 0.281). However, in the privileged-existence condition, competitor consideration did not increase in the critical analysis window relative to the baseline for either the regular phonological competitor (0.06 vs. 0.01, p = 0.498), the knowledge-based phonological competitor (0.06 vs. 0.03, p = 0.327), or the visual control object (0.03 vs. 0.01, p = 0.130). This outcome is consistent with previous findings showing that a listeners' sensitivity to the shared vs. privileged status of objects in terms of their existence/physical co-presence is evident in the earliest moments of referential comprehension (e.g., BrownSchmidt et al., 2008; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008 ). In the current study, the contrast between the shared-knowledge and privileged-existence conditions resembles the kind of physical co-presence manipulations used in those studies, although the speaker's perception of the physical scene was mediated by computer in the current case. Fig. 4 . Likelihood of gaze to the competitor as a function of analysis window, the type of competitor object and addressee's knowledge state regarding the objects relative to the speaker, Experiment 1. Note: although the analyses were conducted on the log odds scale, raw proportions are presented for ease of interpretation. Listeners' ability to manage privileged knowledge about object identity. A second model compared processing within the shared-knowledge and privileged-identity conditions. As mentioned above, in the shared-knowledge condition, there should be a larger increase in competitor fixations as the target noun unfolds relative to the baseline window for the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors compared to the visual control object. In the privileged-identity condition, if addressees readily integrate knowledge that the speaker does not know the true identity of a visually misleading object, there should be a larger increase in competitor fixations for the regular phonological competitor compared to the knowledge-based phonological competitor and the visual control object. In addition, competitor fixations should show a pattern across analysis windows that is similar for the knowledge-based phonological competitor and the visual control object. The model testing this prediction included analysis window (baseline vs. critical), knowledge state (shared knowledge vs. privileged identity) and competitor type (regular phonological competitor, knowledge-based phonological competitor, visual control object) and their interactions as fixed effects. In addition, the model included the maximal random effects structure supported by the experimental design. The Analysis Window Â Knowledge State Â Competitor Type interaction in this model was not significant, p = 0.545, reflecting the fact that the pattern of visual consideration of competitor objects is extremely similar in the shared-knowledge and privileged-identity conditions. In other words, the above analysis confirmed that addressees were consistent in the use of their knowledge about object identity across the two knowledge state conditions despite the fact that in the privileged-identity condition this knowledge was privileged.
Summary.
Of greatest interest here is the finding that the pattern of visual consideration for the competitor object in the privileged-identity condition was in fact most similar to the one observed in the shared-knowledge condition. Recall that knowledge-based competitor objects should not in fact reflect phonological competition in this condition if addressees were effectively integrating the knowledge that should be attributed to the speaker. The fact that these objects were considered to the extent observed here therefore suggests that addressees may tend to consider privileged knowledge about object identity to a rather strong degree in the early moments of processing. This clearly contrasts with addressees' demonstrated ability to manage knowledge discrepancies involving objects' existence in the context (using physical co-presence cues), as illustrated in both the current experiment and earlier studies ( One possible explanation for addressees' observed performance in the privileged-identity condition could be that addressees did not have enough information to strongly infer the speaker's ignorance regarding the identity of the visually misleading objects. By contrast, in the privileged-existence condition, the opaque covers placed on the shelf display provide a comparatively salient and high-quality cue regarding the speaker's knowledge of the physical context. It is therefore possible that addressees' performance when faced with identity discrepancies would be boosted if they had additional cues to reinforce the speaker's knowledge state. One relevant cue explored in a number of previous studies involves the way in which objects whose existence has been established via linguistic mention are efficiently recognized as constituting ''shared information'' (in common ground) by addressees, regardless of whether their shared status is reflected in the physical context (Brown-Schmidt, 2009; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Hanna et al., 2003) . For example, Brown-Schmidt (2012) showed that addressees were more likely to consider a game-piece hidden to the speaker as a potential referent if that particular game-piece had been mentioned during previous conversational interaction. In the final experiment we draw on a similar linguistic context manipulation to examine whether stronger cues regarding the speaker's knowledge state may influence addressee's ability to manage privileged information about object identity.
Experiment 2
According to Clark and Marshall (1978) , information mentioned in a discourse becomes a part of the mutually shared information in the communicative context and, as noted above, the effects of this information on real-time processing are well established (see also Clark & Marshall, 1981 ). In the current experiment, we examine whether previous descriptions produced by the speaker that reinforce the speaker's lack of knowledge about an object's true identity facilitate addressees' ability to track the speaker's knowledge state.
Similar to Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 were assigned the role of addressee and followed instructions from a confederate speaker in a different room via an audiovisual conferencing program. The communicative scenario involved the privileged-identity condition from Experiment 1, where the identity of the objects (including knowledge-based phonological competitors) was revealed only to the addressee before each trial while the audiovisual conferencing system was turned off (the shared-knowledge and privileged-existence conditions in Experiment 1 were not used in Experiment 2). As before, we varied the type of competitor that appeared in the critical trials. Specifically, this object could be a regular phonological competitor (e.g., a regular candle) for the target name (e.g., candy), a knowledge-based phonological competitor (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb), or a phonologically unrelated visual control object (e.g., a genuine lightbulb). This manipulation was crossed with a linguistic context manipulation. This manipulation varied whether the confederate speaker referred to the competitor object when it occurred in what we refer to as a ''context trial'' occurring two trials before the corresponding critical trial. In the prior-mention condition, the context trial involved the speaker naming the competitor object in the course of describing the intended location for a different display object (e.g., Pick up the flower and put it above the lightbulb). Critically, for the visually misleading objects used as knowledge-based phonological competitors, the confederate speaker provided names based on the objects' outward appearance (e.g., the lightbulb for a candle that looks like a lightbulb). Thus, the name reflected the speaker's lack of knowledge about the true identity of the visually misleading object. In the no-prior-mention condition, the speaker did not refer to the competitor object in the context trials, although the action being communicated was the same (e.g., Pick up the flower and put it one square to the left). The verbal instructions and object layouts for critical trials were the same as in Experiment 1.
If an earlier description used by the speaker can help support an addressee's ability to consider the speaker's perspective regarding the identity of an object, then upon hearing a target object name (e.g., candle), addressees should show less visual consideration of a knowledge-based phonological competitor (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb) in the prior-mention condition where the speaker will have previously referred to the visually misleading object based on its appearance (e.g., the lightbulb for a candle that looks like a lightbulb), compared to the no-prior-mention condition. Furthermore, the regular phonological competitor (e.g., a regular candle) and the visual control object (e.g., a genuine lightbulb) should show high and low amounts of visual consideration, respectively, regardless of previous mention because their true identity is congruent with their appearance. (In these conditions, the label provided during the context trials reflected the competitor object's true identity.) 3.1. Method
Participants
The participants were 48 undergraduate students recruited from the University of Toronto Mississauga campus community. All participants were either native speakers of English or started to use English by age 7. An additional nine participants were excluded, either for strategically maintaining their gaze toward the center of the display throughout the entire experiment (n = 2), equipment problems (n = 5), because they reported suspecting that the speaker was not another naïve participant during the post-experiment debriefing procedure (n = 1), or because they reported noticing that some of the objects had names with overlapping initial sounds (n = 1). Participants were paid $10 per hour or received course credit for their participation. Participants were tested individually in one session that lasted approximately one hour.
Materials and design
The competitor type manipulation was identical to the one used in Experiment 1. In the current experiment, knowledge about the true identity of the visually misleading object was always privileged to addressees (i.e., as in the privileged-identity condition in Experiment 1); that is, objects were always placed on the shelf display and named only to the addressees while the audiovisual conferencing system was off-line. Thus, the addressee should expect the speaker to be unaware of a knowledge-based competitor's true identity (e.g., the speaker should not know that a candle that looks like a lightbulb is actually a candle). Furthermore, as described above, we included a linguistic context manipulation in which the competitor object occurred in a display two trials earlier than the corresponding critical trial (see Fig. 5 for an example of the trial sequence). In the prior-mention condition, one of the instructions in these context trials involved reference to the eventual competitor object (including knowledge-based phonological competitors), using a description that reflected the object's appearance. In the no-prior-mention condition, the speaker did not refer to the competitor objects in the context trials at all. The no-prior-mention condition therefore resembled the privileged-existence condition in Experiment 1, where the addressee infers the speaker's knowledge state based only on the assumption that the speaker will categorize a visually misleading object based on its appearance. On critical trials, the instructions provided by the speaker were identical to those in Experiment 1.
In addition to the nine critical trials and nine context trials, there were two practice trials and 15 filler trials were included to avoid contingencies that might bias addressees towards the target in the critical trials. Out of 33 trials in total, 11 had all-new objects and 22 (nine critical and 13 filler/context trials) had objects that appeared in previous trials. Eleven of the objects that appeared in previous trials (all filler and context trials) were objects that had to be moved on their second occurrence, whereas 11 were not moved in either trial (nine on critical trials and two in filler/context trials). Furthermore, on 16 trials (six critical and 10 filler/context) the first object to be moved was on the left side of the display and on another 17 trials (three critical and 14 filler/context) it was on the right side of the display. In addition, 16 trials (nine critical and seven filler/context) had displays that contained three objects and 17 trials (all fillers/context trials) had displays that contained four objects. Finally, seven filler trials and context trials had displays containing hard-to-name objects (e.g., several constructor-set pieces attached to each other).
Procedure
The procedure was analogous to the privileged-identity condition in Experiment 1, where the experimenter always turned the audiovisual conferencing system off before placing objects on the display and naming them to the addressee.
Results and discussion
Coding
Coding procedures were as in Experiment 1. A total of 2.5% of trials were excluded because of experimenter error while placing the objects on the display or equipment failure (no sound recorded).
Statistical modeling
Statistical modeling was conducted in the same way as in Experiment 1. Analysis window, linguistic context, competitor type and their interactions were entered as fixed effects into the linear mixed effects model. The model that properly converged included random intercept, random slopes for analysis window, competitor type, and Analysis Window Â Competitor type for participants as well as random intercept, random slopes for analysis window, linguistic context, competitor type and all of their interactions for items. As for Experiment 1, the main effects and interactions not involving analysis window are reported in Appendix B. Fig. 6 plots competitor fixations across the analysis window, linguistic context and competitor type conditions. Table 5 presents the summary of the main effects and interactions tested by the model as well as the follow up comparisons conducted in Experiment 2. The proportion of fixations to the competitor and target as a function of time, the type of competitor and linguistic context are shown in Appendix D.
Eye movement data
As in Experiment 1, of most interest is how competitor fixations changed from the baseline window to the critical analysis window as a function of linguistic context and competitor type. The model revealed a significant main effect of analysis window (v 2 (1) = 6.10, p = 0.013). This effect reflects the fact that overall participants were less likely to fixate the competitor objects during the baseline (likelihood = 0.11) rather than critical (likelihood = 0.16) analysis window. This was qualified by a significant Analysis . Likelihood of gaze to the competitor as a function of analysis window, the type of competitor object and linguistic context, Experiment 2. Note: although the analyses were conducted on the log odds scale, raw proportions are presented for ease of interpretation. (2) = 6.65, p = 0.036. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed that, for regular phonological competitors and knowledge-based phonological competitors, the likelihood of fixating the competitor significantly increased in the critical analysis window relative to the baseline (0.21 vs. 0.11, v 2 (1) = 7.97, p = 0.005, and 0.20 vs. 0.14, v 2 (1) = 8.91, p = 0.003, respectively). However, for visual control objects, they did not attract more fixations in the critical analysis window relative to the baseline window (0.09 vs. 0.08, p = 0.797). Thus the unfolding target noun triggered consideration of the competitor only when the competitor was a regular phonological competitor or knowledge-based phonological competitor and not when the competitor was a visual control object. The lack of a significant interaction between analysis window and linguistic context, p = 0.615, or an interaction between analysis window, competitor type and linguistic context, p = 0.520, suggests that this pattern was consistent across the no-prior-mention and prior-mention conditions.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that addressees strongly considered their own privileged knowledge about the competitor's identity as the ambiguous part of the target object name was heard, even when they had supplementary linguistic cues highlighting that the speaker was unaware of the knowledge-based competitor's true identity. Addressees' consideration of the competitor object in the condition with knowledge-based competitors was the same as what was observed with regular phonological competitors despite the fact that the speaker had previously referred to the visually misleading competitor object on the basis of its appearance (e.g., the lightbulb for the candle that looks like a lightbulb). Thus, supportive linguistic information that explicitly signals the speaker's knowledge state regarding the identity of the visually misleading objects did not change addressees' tendency to consider their privileged knowledge about these objects' identity.
General discussion
Our goals in the present study were to investigate how addressees in conversation manage privileged knowledge about the identity of objects in the earliest moments of language processing, and to directly compare this to cases involving knowledge about the existence/presence of objects. In two experiments, we monitored eye movements as addressees followed a confederate speaker's instructions in a conversational context in which visually misleading objects served as competitor items in displays where another object served as the target (e.g., candy).
In Experiment 1, we found that, when the competitor objects were occluded from the speaker's view, addressees were measurably less likely to visually consider these objects upon hearing the target name than when they were visible to both an addressee and the speaker. This is consistent with previous findings showing that the shared vs. privileged status of objects in terms of their existence/physical co-presence is evident in the earliest moments of referential processing (e.g., Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Hanna et al., 2003; Heller et al., 2008) . Furthermore, in contrast to Barr (2008b) who also used a lexical competition paradigm to explore co-presence effects, the current results suggest that listeners' sensitivity to another person's perspective can in fact influence comprehension as individual speech sounds are mapped to noun candidates. In a computer-based interaction task, Barr (2008b) found that when the target name (e.g., ''buckle'') was heard, the proportion of fixations to a phonological competitor (e.g., a bucket) initially increased at the same rate as target fixations regardless of whether the competitor was in privileged or common ground (which was signaled by the color of a background square accompanying the image of the competitor). In the current experiment, however, the increase in competitor fixations during the unfolding target noun relative to the baseline was significantly higher with regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors compared to visual control objects when they were visible to both interlocutors but the increase was not significant when they were covered from the speaker's perspective. Nevertheless, the fact that, in the overall model, the three-way interaction between the analysis window, knowledge state, and competitor type was only approaching significance suggests that the regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors might not be completely suppressed even when they were covered from the speaker's perspective-a pattern that is somewhat evident in the data. These mild bottom-up effects arising from phonological overlap are in fact not specific to situations involving visual cues to common ground but occur even when strong and local linguistic constraints (sentential semantics and, in bilingual contexts, the currently relevant language) are incongruent with the ''intruding'' lexical competitors in visual world studies (cf. Chambers & Cooke, 2009; Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2004) .
One possible explanation for why listeners' early sensitivity to the shared vs. privileged status of objects in terms of their existence/physical co-presence was evident in the current study but not in Barr (2008b) rests on differences in the methodology used in the two studies. Barr (2008b) presented stimuli on a computer screen whereas in the current study addressees interacted with real objects. In addition, Barr (2008b) used pre-recorded instructions, whereas the current study involved a live speaker located in a different room. As suggested by Brennan and Hanna (2009) , the use of a live speaker and only partially scripted instructions may have enriched the interaction and strengthened the potential to detect partner-specific effects because they increase the utility of taking the speaker's perspective.
Importantly, addressees' ability to successfully manage privileged knowledge about the existence of entities in Experiment 1 contrasted with their performance when knowledge about entities' identity was at issue. Indeed, the most striking finding from Experiment 1 was that listeners considered privileged knowledge about the identity of objects in the course of incrementally mapping nouns to referential candidates. The extent to which privileged knowledge was considered did not differ from a situation where this identity knowledge was shared between conversational participants.
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether the confederate speaker's prior use of descriptions that highlighted her lack of knowledge about the visually misleading objects' true identities would reduce an addressee's tendency to consider privileged knowledge in the early moments of processing. Surprisingly, the results showed a pattern that was similar to the one found in Experiment 1: Even when the speaker had previously referred to a visually misleading object on a basis of its outward appearance-thereby reinforcing her understanding of the object's identity-addressees still showed evidence of using privileged knowledge about object identity during referential interpretation. It is important to point out, however, that the current data do not suggest that taking other's perspective regarding object identity is impossible. As suggested by a number of researchers (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Brown-Schmidt, 2012; Clark & Brennan, 1989) , establishing common ground in some cases may require a substantial amount of collaboration and interaction between the conversational partners. For example, Brennan and Clark (1996) showed that it required several turns to establish mutually agreed upon conceptualization of ambiguous figures and to use these conceptualizations in subsequent communication. In addition, Brown-Schmidt (2012) suggested that listeners' sensitivity to other's knowledge was somewhat moderated by the way the existence of occluded objects was revealed to them and by the type of feedback provided by the speaker. Thus, it is possible that more positive and/or negative evidence regarding the knowledge state of the speaker is required to reduce listeners' consideration of privileged knowledge about the identity of objects in the course of incrementally mapping nouns to referential candidates. Nevertheless, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that the bias to take into account privileged knowledge regarding objects' identity is comparatively strong and is not easily shifted by cues that have been shown to support perspective-taking abilities in studies where knowledge discrepancies involve the existence/ physical co-presence of referential objects.
Why do addressees consistently consider privileged knowledge about an object's identity as a referring expression unfolds? One possible explanation involves the salience of the perceptually misleading objects used in the current study. In particular, the novelty items used as stimuli are quite striking in terms of the gap between what they look like and what they really are. It is possible that once an individual recognizes that a visually misleading object is something very different from what it appears to be, it becomes interesting at some level to think about the contrast with its true identity. Thus, the acquired knowledge about an object's true identity might not be effectively inhibited, even when the communicative context suggests that the conversational partner does not possess this knowledge. According to this explanation, it would follow that materials involving less striking appearance-identity discrepancies might lead to a different pattern of performance on the part of addressees (e.g., a wrapped present that the speaker believes is a gift for person A whereas the addressee knows it is intended for person B). On the other hand, this line of argument cannot explain the finding that participants in Experiment 1 did not have any trouble avoiding the consideration of visually misleading objects when these objects were covered from the speaker's view.
Another explanation for the observed differences between the existence and identity cases appeals to differences in the representational demands required to resolve the respective types of knowledge discrepancies. Namely, in the existence cases, the addressee's task is to simply suppress an entity from a set of possible referents. This may be a comparatively easy task in terms of mental representation because the occluded object is recognized as not being ''perceived'' by the speaker and, in turn, can be straightforwardly indexed as irrelevant or outside the currently relevant referential domain of interpretation (see, e.g., Brennan & Hanna, 2009) . However, in the identity cases studied here, the range of referential candidates is the same in each case, and the task for the addressee is to make an inference about the way in which the speaker perceives and categorizes elements in the set. The perception (and assigned category) of a given object, in turn, restricts only the relevance of particular labels for referential communication. In other words, in identity cases, the addressee needs to make an inference about the possible ways in which the speaker can talk about objects rather than whether he or she can talk about them at all. Thus, the knowledge discrepancies in identity cases involve selected subtypes of information associated with the referents rather than the referents as a whole. Indeed, the cognitive development literature suggests that tasks requiring an appreciation of knowledge discrepancies related to selected features of referents are comparatively difficult for children (Apperly & Robinson, 1998; Apperly & Robinson, 2003; Hulme, Mitchell, & Wood, 2003; Sprung, Perner, & Mitchell, 2007) . Apperly and Butterfill (2009) have suggested that a similar contrast is found in adult cognition (see also Low & Watts, 2013) . In particular, they claim that the ability of an adult to track other adults' beliefs about objects they have not seen or are unaware of is rather automatic and quite efficient. In contrast, reasoning about others' beliefs that involve complex combinations of properties and modes of presentation is effortful and cognitively demanding.
A related explanation for addressees' tendency to consider privileged knowledge about an object's true identity appeals to the notion of psychological essentialism. Psychological essentialism involves the idea that most ontological categories (e.g., 'insect') have some stable underlying reality (Gelman, 2004) . Once this reality is established for an entity, altering its superficial appearance (e.g., making an insect perceptually similar to a leaf) does not remove its essence in the mind of an individual (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 1989) . For example, children draw inferences about objects based on their essence even when it competes with their perceptual features (Gelman & Markman, 1986; Gelman & Wellman, 1991) . Thus, it is possible that the patterns observed in the current study reflect a robust essentialist bias in the way that mental representations for visually perceived objects are constructed and maintained in working memory. This explanation is consistent with data reported by Frisson and Wakefield (2012) from a study of narrative comprehension. In their study, participants read a series of stories in which animals were superficially transformed into other animals (e.g., a donkey was transformed into a zebra by painting stripes on its back). When after the transformation the narrator referred to the animal using a term reflecting its true identity (e.g., the donkey) participants read the term faster than when it was reflecting the animal's appearance (e.g., the zebra). However, reading times for the two types of terms did not differ when they were embedded into a direct discourse of a story character who was naïve to the transformation (e.g., the naïve story character is described as being unaware that the zebra looking animal is actually a donkey). If readers were sensitive to the story character's unawareness about the transformation, one would expect them to read the term reflecting the animal's appearance (e.g., the zebra) faster than when it is reflecting its true identity (e.g., the donkey). In other words, Frisson and Wakefield showed a bias towards psychological essentialism as well as a failure to integrate a naïve character's perspective about the animal's identity in real-time narrative comprehension. A psychological essentialism explanation is also consistent with Hanna et al.'s (2003) findings showing that addressees successfully draw on a speaker's perspective during referential processing when the speaker's false belief involved only features of objects that were not central to its identity or capacity to serve a situationally-required function (e.g., when the speaker correctly believed there were two hidden jars but falsely believed that one of them contained olives). It is possible that perspective differences that do not involve non-essential features of object identity are easier to overcome than the ones involving discrepancies involving an object's core identity. It also remains an open question to what extent the more effective suppression of privileged knowledge observed by Hanna et al. would occur if the speaker's false belief had been inferred from the situational context rather than through explicit misinformation provided by an experimenter.
More generally, the issues noted above raise the question of whether full suppression of privileged knowledge about identity would be adaptive or possible, even in a context where a strategy of ignoring one's own knowledge would arguably serve to increase efficiency in reference resolution. For this reason, we have been careful to avoid describing listeners' use of privileged information as reflecting ''difficulty'' in perspective taking, and instead prefer to highlight a need for future research to clarify the value and function of privileged identity information in interactive conversation. On this note, it is important to acknowledge that efficient perspective-taking in linguistic reference cannot be reduced to a heuristic of considering only the information shared with an interlocutor but also involves a consideration of privileged knowledge in some contexts (Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008) and, more generally, is likely to involve a sophisticated process of balancing and integrating privileged and shared information (Heller et al., 2008) . We suggest that discrepancies in identity knowledge may provide a particularly useful testing ground for exploring these ideas in greater detail.
A.1. Norming experiment
The goal of the norming experiment was to confirm that, when the true identity of visually misleading objects used in Experiments 1 and 2 is not known, they will be identified and named in terms of their outward appearance. Participants were 30 undergraduate students recruited from the University of Toronto Mississauga community who did not participate in Experiment 1 or 2. All participants were either native speakers of English or started to learn English in North America from the age of 7 or earlier. An additional two participants were excluded because of experimenter error during the presentation of stimuli. Participants were paid $5 per half hour or received course credit for their participation. Participants were tested individually in one session lasting approximately 30 min.
A.1.1. Method
On each trial, an object was placed alone in a compartment of the shelf display also used in Experiments 1 and 2, and participants (seated at the same distance as those in the main experiments) were asked to name the object. There were nine critical trials, and the nature of the object that was presented was manipulated across three conditions by varying the specific ''version'' of the object that was shown. In the visually misleading object condition, the object's outward appearance was misleading (e.g., a candle that looks like a lightbulb or a yo-yo that looks like a baseball, see Fig. 1 , Panel B for an example). The visually misleading objects were positioned such that any perceptual features that could reveal their true identity were hidden due to the physical orientation of the object on the shelf. For example, in the case of the candle that looks like a lightbulb and the yo-yo that looks like a baseball, the wick and the string were not visible when the objects were placed on the shelf. For this reason the objects were placed on the shelf in the same orientation as they were seen by the speaker in Experiments 1 and 2. In the identity-matched object condition, the objects belonged to the same category as the corresponding visually misleading object but their outward appearance made them straightforwardly identifiable (e.g., a prototypical candle or a prototypical yo-yo, see Panel A). In the appearance-matched object condition, the objects to be named had the same perceptual features as the corresponding visually misleading object but in this case their identity matched their appearance (e.g., a genuine lightbulb or a genuine baseball, see Panel C). The type of object manipulation in the norming experiment therefore closely matched the type of competitor manipulation used in Experiments 1 and 2. The pairing of objects to conditions was cycled across participants through the use of three presentation lists. Each participant saw only one of the three versions of each critical object, but across participants, each critical object occurred in all experimental conditions. Critical trials were intermixed with 15 filler trials, 10 of which involved objects that were difficult to name (e.g., a component of a bicycle gear shifter) and five of which involved comparatively easy-to-name objects (e.g., a glass).
A.1.2. Results
Because the goal of the norming experiment was to confirm that participants could not recognize the true identity of the visually misleading objects based on their outward appearance, the names provided for the critical objects by the participants were coded based on whether they reflected actual identity of the objects or not. For example, given a candle that looked like a lightbulb, responses such as the candle, the lightbulb candle, or the odd candle would suggest that the participant recognized the fact that the object is a candle despite its non-canonical visual features. Thus, such responses would be classified as reflecting the object's actual identity. Responses such as the lightbulb, the toy lightbulb or the weird lightbulb would be classified as reflecting the fact that the participants did not recognize the fact that the object is a candle.
As expected, in the identity-matched and appearance-matched conditions, the object names reflected a judgment of object identity based on the perceptual features of objects (100% for each condition). More important, participants overwhelmingly named the visually misleading objects based on their appearance (98%) rather than their identity (2%). For example, the candle that looked like a lightbulb was called the lightbulb in all trials and the yo-yo that looked like a baseball was called the baseball, the toy baseball, the mini baseball, and the plastic baseball. Although the different labels suggest that participants did not all conceptualize the visually misleading objects in the same way, all the labels they provided nevertheless confirmed that, when the true identity of a visually misleading object was not made apparent, this identity could not be discerned from object's outward appearance.
Appendix B
B.1. Looking patterns across the analysis windows in Experiment 1
The mixed effects model revealed a main effect of knowledge state, v 2 (2) = 12.59, p = 0.002, suggesting that consideration of the competitor (across all competitor types and across the two analysis windows) was overall lower in the privileged-existence condition (likelihood = 0.03) than in the privileged-identity condition (likelihood = 0.14), v 2 (1) = 11.78, p < 0.001 or than in the shared-knowledge condition (likelihood = 0.11), v 2 (1) = 9.76, p = 0.002. Further, consideration of the competitor did not differ in these latter two conditions, p = 0.940. These finding are consistent with Barr (2008b) showing that when the competitor objects were occluded from the speaker's view, addressees were less likely to look to these objects than when the competitor objects were visible to both an addressee and the speaker (shared-knowledge and privileged-identity conditions). The mixed effects model revealed that there was no main effect of competitor type (p = 0.106), suggesting that consideration of the different types of competitors was similar (across all knowledge states and the two analysis windows). Finally, there was no Knowledge State Â Competitor Type interaction (p = 0.917), suggesting that consideration of different types of competitors did not differ within different knowledge state conditions across the two analysis windows.
B.2. Looking patterns across the analysis windows in Experiment 2
The linear mixed effects model revealed a main effect of com- (1) = 7.47, p = 0.007. However, competitor consideration was not significantly different for regular and knowledge-based phonological competitors, p = 0.547. Furthermore, the lack of a significant main effect of linguistic context, p = 0.929, or an interaction between competitor type and linguistic context, p = 0.792, suggests that this pattern was consistent across the no-prior-mention and prior-mention conditions.
Appendix C
The proportion of fixations to target and competitor objects over time, across conditions (Experiment 1). The dashed lines reflect the beginning and end of the critical analysis window (200-700 ms after target noun [e.g., candy] onset), corresponding to the temporary ambiguous portion of the noun.
Shared Knowledge
Privileged Existence Privileged Identity
...c a n d y...
...c a n d y... 
